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Introduction: A distinction has been proposed, on theoretical grounds, between referential
and inferential semantic abilities. The former account for the relationship of words to the
world, the latter for the relationship of words among themselves. The hypothesis of, at
least partially, different neurological underpinnings for this distinction has been supported
by the presence of double dissociations in neurological patients between tasks that can be
considered to tap the cognitive processes involving these two different classes of semantic
knowledge, such as, for example, picture naming (referential) and naming to a verbal
definition (inferential).
Methods: We report here the results of a functional magnetic resonance experiment, con-
trasting the pattern of brain activity associated with, respectively, “referential” (picture
naming, word-to-picture matching) and “inferential” (naming to definition, word-to-word
matching) tasks.
Results: All tasks activate an extensive set of brain areas involving both hemispheres,
corresponding to the “common semantic network”. In addition, left hemispheric temporal
areas are selectively engaged by the inferential tasks. Conversely, a specific activation of
the right fusiform gyrus is associated with the referential tasks.
Conclusions: These findings suggest that while inferential tasks, as compared with refer-
ential tasks, engage additional processing resources subserved by left hemispheric
language areas involved in lexical retrieval, referential tasks (as compared with inferential
tasks) recruit right hemispheric areas generally associated with nonverbal conceptual and
structural object processing. These findings are compatible with the double dissociations
reported in neurological patients.
ª 2012 Elsevier Srl. All rights reserved.ent, University of Turin, S. Ottavio 20, 10124 Turin, Italy.
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c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 2 ) 1e1 221. Introduction might be neurally implemented, i.e., that different subsys-Competence on words involves phonological, morphological
and syntactic abilities. In addition, it involves abilities that are
usually characterized as “semantic”. These appear to be of two
kinds (Marconi, 1997). On the one hand,we knowhow to relate
words to other words. We know that cats are animals, we can
verbally describe the difference between walking and running,
we understand that “a polished or smooth surface that forms
images by reflection” is a mirror. On the other hand, we know
how to relate words to the world out there, as presented to us
in perception.We can tell cats from cows by calling the former
cats and the latter cows, we can describe a man as running
rather thanwalking, and we can pick up the appropriate tool if
requested to obey the order “Bring me the hammer, not the
pliers!”. The former have been called ‘inferential’ and the
latter ‘referential’ abilities. Inferential abilities lie at the basis
of so-called “material inferences” (cf. Brandom, 1994), such as
the inference from ‘Felix is a cat’ to ‘Felix is a mammal’ or
from ‘Milan is north of Rome’ to ‘Rome is south of Milan’ (as
distinct from logical inferences, such as the inference from ‘If
it’s Thursday I have a class’ and ‘It’s Thursday’ to ‘I have
a class’). Referential abilities, in turn, cognitively mediate the
relation of reference between words and things. The distinc-
tion between inferential and referential abilities should not be
conflated with the distinction between inferential role
semantics and referential (or truth conditional) semantics,
familiar from the philosophy ofmind and language (see Block,
1986). The latter is a distinction between different theoretical
accounts of meaning, whereas the former concerns (lexical)
semantic competence. While truth conditional semantics
aims at determining objective truth conditions thatmay elude
the abilities of every speaker in a linguistic community
(Putnam, 1975), referential competence coincides with the
ability a speaker has to relate words to the world thanks to
perception and other cognitive faculties.
Relative to many ordinary words, most of us are quite
competent both inferentially and referentially. However, for
many other words competence varies widely from speaker to
speaker. For example, a trained zoologist may be more
competent than most of us on the word manatee (as she is
more competent on manatees, the animals themselves).
Moreover, an individual speaker may be more competent
referentially than inferentially: a person may be extremely
skilled at telling primroses from other flowers without
knowing the first things about primroses, while a bookish
scientist may know all there is to know about a rare tropical
flowerwhile having trouble to recognize one, as she never saw
it in nature. Thus, the two sides of lexical semantic compe-
tence can be said to be relatively independent of each other
(see Marconi, 1997 for further details).
In principle, there is no reason to expect that distinct
abilities underlie the intuitive distinction between inferential
and referential performances, or that they are implemented
by distinct functional subsystems in the brain. The distinction
might only be a classification of patterns of behavior involved
in ordinary use of the lexicon. Some evidence from both
neuropsychological case studies and (to a lesser extent) neu-
roimaging, however, seems to indicate that the distinctionPlease cite this article in press as: Marconi D, et al., The neural s
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responsible for cognitive performances involving inferential
and referential aspects of semantics, respectively. It is evident
that, from the point of view of the access to information,
referential semantics has a close connection to perceptual
modalities, in particular to vision, but also to audition and
somatosensory perception. An impairment in referential
tasks may thus reflect defective access of perceptual infor-
mation to the semantic system, as in the case of the classical
“disconnection syndromes” (for a recent review see Catani
and ffytche, 2005), while an apparent inferential impairment
may be the consequence of a language disorder.
How could the distinction between referential and infer-
ential performances be mapped on the tasks that have been
used in neuropsychology? In clinical neuropsychology,
a distinction is traditionally made between naming tasks
(including production of a noun corresponding to a picture, or
to a linguistic definition) and matching tasks (including selec-
tion of a picture or a word matching a word stimulus among
alternatives), assessing, respectively, language production and
comprehension at the singleword level. From the point of view
of the cognitive processes involved, all these tasks share the
requirements for visual perceptual analysis, access to lexical
and semantic information and lexical retrieval. According to
the previous distinction (Marconi, 1997), however, picture
naming and word-to-picture matching can be seen as referen-
tial performances, for they involve the languageeworld rela-
tion (¼reference) asmediated by visual perception. In contrast,
naming from definition and verbal matching are inferential
performances, as they exclusively involve the semantic prop-
erties of words and sentences. In what follows, we shall use
‘inferential naming’ e InfNam for the definition-to-noun task,
and ‘referential naming’ e RefNam for the picture-to-noun
task. Accordingly, word-to-picture matching tasks (such as
selecting the picture of a carrot as corresponding to the word
‘carrot’) are considered as referential tasks, while word-to-
word matching tasks are considered as inferential. It could
be remarked that written or spoken words, like pictures, must
be perceived to be processed. This is, of course, correct;
however, it does not follow that the tasks we regard as infer-
ential are really referential or that there is no significant
distinction between both kinds of task. It is one thing to relate
(perceived)words to otherwords, and a different thing to relate
pictures (or objects) to words or words to pictures, though
perception is involved in both cases, at some stage.
Let us now consider the neuropsychological evidence in
some detail.
1.1. Spared inferential, impaired referential processing
In a number of cases, impaired referential tasks (e.g., picture
naming and/or word-to-picture matching) go together with
good or even excellent inferential abilities. Most cases of
“optic aphasia” fall within this category. For example, JB,
a patient reported by Riddoch and Humphreys (1987b) scored
45.5% on naming from vision and obtained an accuracy of 70%
on a word-to-picture matching with target and distractors
which were visually and semantically similar (100% whenubstrates of inferential and referential semantic processing,
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 2 ) 1e1 2 3target and distracters were dissimilar). Interestingly, he was
100% correct in two inferential tasks, matching words to
definitions and wordeword matching task (coordinate
matching). Several other cases of preserved inferential abili-
ties, going together with referential deficits of some kind, have
been reported (Farah et al., 1991; Hart and Gordon, 1992;
Lhermitte and Beauvois, 1973; Warrington, 1975). It should be
noted that picture naming has been found to dissociate from
word-to-picture (and word-to-object) matching. Thus e.g.,
patient EST, who showed a deficit in naming but, was 97%
correct on word-to-picture matching (limited to concrete
words, Kay and Ellis, 1987). Another patient, KR, was 100%
correct on word-to-picture matching in spite of a profound
naming deficit (limited to animals, Hart and Gordon, 1992);
similarly, SF, whose naming performance was poor (between
20.8% and 23.3% correct), could draw objects from their names
and selectively match pictures to words (Lhermitte and
Beauvois, 1973; Lucchelli and De Renzi, 1992; Miceli et al.,
1991; Riddoch and Humphreys, 1987a). By contrast, patient
DT exhibited the complementary deficit: “When single
pictures of objects were presented he immediately named
them (9/10); when he was requested to point to one of two
pictures in a word-[to-] picture matching task, he named both
of them, pointing at random” (Silveri and Colosimo, 1995).
These findings motivated one of us to draw a distinction
within referential competence, between a naming ability that
would be responsible for naming performances and an
application ability, that would be responsible for perfor-
mances such asword-to-picture andword-to-objectmatching
(Marconi, 1997). There are, however, some cases in which
inferential processing has been found to dissociate from both
kinds of referential processing (e.g., Riddoch and Humphreys,
1987b; Warrington, 1975).
1.2. Spared referential, impaired inferential processing
The complementary dissociation (selective preservation of
referential abilities) is definitely less frequent. Preserved
visual naming in a patient with severe single word compre-
hension impairment, as assessed with inferential tasks, was
first reported by Heilman et al. (1976), who attributed this
clinical picture to a unidirectional disconnection from Wer-
nicke’s area to the “concept centre”. A similar case was re-
ported by the same author in 1981 (Heilman et al., 1981).
Kremin (1986) described the case of ORL, a patient afflicted
with ametastatic lesion involving the left frontal lobe. Though
ORL’s RefNam performance for both real objects and pictures
was close to perfect (95e100%), and spoken word-to-picture
matching was fair (66% in a four choices task), she was
severely impaired both in auditory pairing synonyms and in
word association (12% correct in the latter). In addition she
was impaired in a picture e picture matching task (48%).
Shuren et al. (1993) reported a case of a patient (patient 3) with
a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s Disease (AD), who showed
preserved visual naming (100%) and word-to-picture match-
ing (98.33% vs 100% in controls). Otherwise, the same patient
showed an impairment in definition-to-noun tasks (one
predominantly based on associative information, 79% vs
98e99% in controls, the other on structural information, 67%
vs 97%e87% in controls). The syndrome, labeled “nonopticPlease cite this article in press as: Marconi D, et al., The neural s
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going “from the internal visual representations to the
lexicon”, bypassing the semantic system. Other AD patients
with relatively preserved RefNam and poor verbal processing
were more recently reported by Visch-Brink et al. (2004 cases
1, 2 and 3), though in this study word-to-picture matching
performance was not investigated.
As in the case of the opposite dissociation, in some
patients, when inferential abilities are lost or severely
impaired, it is either RefNam (Brennen et al., 1996) or word-to-
picture matching (Hart and Gordon, 1992; Hittmair-Delazer
et al., 1994; Semenza and Zettin, 1989) that is preserved.
To summarize, the selective impairment of referential
abilities is not uncommon, and is characteristic of optic
aphasia. In the latter condition RefNam from vision is typically
lost or impaired, whereas InfNam from definition is typically
preserved. In the case of optic aphasia, the dissociation has
been explained by hypothesizing two or more separate
semantic domains, e.g., “visual” and “verbal” (Beauvois, 1982).
On an alternative hypothesis, though the semantic system is
unitary and need not be organized in separate subdomains,
there are “privileged relationships” between certain types of
input and semantic representation as such: e.g., access to
semantic representation from vision is bound to privilege
perceptually salient features of objects or pictures (Caramazza
and Hillis, 1990; see Caramazza and Mahon, 2006 for further
discussion). The much rarer cases of selective inferential
impairment have been interpreted as the consequence of
selective lexical semantic impairment, bypassed by a direct
route from visual processing to the lexicon.
Additional neurological evidence for the distinction
between referential and inferential can be derived from neu-
roimaging studies investigating semantic memory. Most of
these studies, however, have focused on the distinction
between different types ofmaterials (i.e., verbal vs nonverbal),
presented through the visual (Bright et al., 2004; Moore and
Price, 1999; Vandenberghe et al., 1996; Vandenbulcke et al.,
2006) and auditory (Dick et al., 2007; Thierry et al., 2003;
Visser and Lambon Ralph, 2011) modalities. It is clear that the
inferential versus referential distinction does not exactly map
onto the verbal-nonverbal distinction. While inferential tasks
are exclusively verbal, referential tasks, such as word-to-
picture matching, involve both verbal and nonverbal material.
Nevertheless, both classes of tasks are considered as “verbal” in
the imaging literature, while non verbal tasks are typically
based on the matching of pictures or nonverbal sounds.
Following this distinction, several studies have highlighted,
in addition to a common left lateralized semantic network,
material-specific activations, involving left hemispheric
regions for verbal stimuli and right hemispheric regions for
nonverbal stimuli (Thierry et al., 2003; Thierry and Price, 2006;
Vandenberghe et al., 1996 as reanalyzed by Thierry and Price,
2006; Vandenbulcke et al., 2006). Specifically, some authors
found that left middle and superior temporal regions were
selectively more involved for verbal material, while the right
midfusiform and right posterior middle temporal cortex were
selectively more involved for nonverbal processing (Thierry
and Price, 2006; Vandenberghe et al., 1996 as in Thierry and
Price, 2006; and for converging evidence in patients with
neurodegenerative pathologies see Butler et al., 2009).ubstrates of inferential and referential semantic processing,
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nonverbal materials refers to the presence or absence of
words as stimuli. However, this dichotomy does not include
conditions in which both types of materials are considered
(namely the referential conditions). The impact of increasing/
decreasing amount of verbal information in input has been
addressed by a recent functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI) study (Hocking and Price, 2009), using an audiovisual
matching task. Subjects were asked to indicate if two stimuli,
simultaneously presented in both the auditory and the
visual modality, referred to the same object or not. Four
experimental conditions were adopted combining the two
types of material (verbal and nonverbal): verbale
verbal (spoken word-written word), verbal-nonverbal (spoken
word e photography), nonverbal-verbal (written word-
environmental sound), nonverbalenonverbal (environmental
sound-photography). The left superior temporal sulcus was
more involved as verbal content increased, the right fusiform
gyrus (RFG) with nonverbal material (decrease of verbal
information). Some of the conditions used in this study can be
considered as inferential (involving only words, verbaleverbal
condition) or referential (involving both words and pictures or
sounds, verbalenonverbal and nonverbaleverbal conditions)
within our conceptual framework. This study does notmake it
clear whether the hemispheric asymmetry for material type
remains significant when only verbal information (inferential
tasks) is directly compared with information containing both
verbal and nonverbal material (referential tasks). In addition,
stimuli were not presented in the same modality, therefore
the differences could be affected by cross modal integration
processes.
Evidence from studies of patients with semantic dementia
with left/right asymmetry of atrophy appears to support the
hemispheric asymmetries involving the verbal versus nonverbal
dichotomy. Recently some research showed that nonverbal
tasks aremore affected by right temporal damage (Butler et al.,
2009; Ikeda et al., 2006; Mion et al., 2010; but see Thompson
et al., 2003), verbal tasks by left temporal damage (Hosogi
Senaha et al., 2007; Mion et al., 2010; Thompson et al., 2003).
Finally, evidence derived from the study of patients with
semantic dementia performing referential tasks, such as
picture naming and word-to-picture matching may also be
relevant. Patients with greater left than right temporal atrophy
were more impaired than patients with greater right than left
atrophy on both referential tasks (Thompson et al., 2003) or on
picture naming only (Mendez et al., 2011). In addition, Mion
et al. (2010) showed that the left anterior fusiform metabo-
lism most contributed to predicting scores on picture naming
and category fluency, whereas the right anterior fusiform
metabolism was most responsible for scores on a nonverbal
test (pictureepicture matching). Some additional evidence
points to a role of the right temporal lobe for referential tasks.
Patients with semantic dementia with predominately left
temporal atrophy were more impaired in naming objects than
in word-to-picture matching, while those with greater right
temporal involvement showed a similar impairment for both
referential tasks (Lambon Ralph et al., 2001).
Thus, the way in which the right and left temporal lobes
contribute to inferential versus referential processing remains
unclear. The fMRI study reported by Tomaszewki Farias et al.Please cite this article in press as: Marconi D, et al., The neural s
Cortex (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2012.08.001(2005) could be considered relevant for the present issue. They
had 10 healthy right-handed participants performing
a RefNam task (naming line drawings from the Boston
Naming Test), and 10 additional participants performing
a naming to definition task. Two participants performed both
tasks. The tasks were found to be associated with distinct
activation patterns. The picture naming task, which according
to the distinction proposed here is referential, compared to
the inferential, naming to verbal description task, resulted in
significant activations in several extra-temporal sites,
including the cuneus and middle occipital gyri, as well as
some other areas, including the insula, cingulate, para-
hippocampal, and inferior parietal gyri. In general, the picture
naming task was associated with greater activation of the
right hemisphere as compared with the definition-to-noun
task. In contrast, the naming to verbal description task
resulted in significant activations within the inferior, middle,
and superior temporal gyri of the dominant hemisphere.
Other areas outside of the temporal lobe were also identified
in this contrast, most notably in the inferior frontal lobe. The
results are partially in line with the hemispheric asymmetries
reflecting the verbal versus nonverbal dichotomy.
The available evidence is compatible with the hypothesis
that the neurological mechanisms involved in referential and
inferential semantic processing at the single word level can be
differentiated, independent of specific task requirements. In
order to confirm this hypothesis, and to identify the brain
structures that can differentiate these abilities, it is necessary
to directly assess the brain activity associated with compa-
rable tasks (naming and matching), involving, respectively,
referential and inferential processing.
This is the aim of the present fMRI study. We hypothesize
that (1) partially different areas are involved in inferential
versus referential processing as such, (2) the difference persists
across different kinds of task (naming vs matching). In
particular, as inferential tasks only involve words and sen-
tences as stimuli, we expect these tasks to engage brain
regions associated with language processing more than refer-
ential tasks do. In contrast, referential tasks, constituted by an
association betweenwords and pictures,might recruit some of
the same areas engaged by inferential tasks in that they
involve the processing of linguistic materials, but also areas
reported to be specific for nonverbal tasks. If this is the case, it
is further possible that the difference between referential
versus inferential processing may involve hemispheric asym-
metries, i.e., left hemispheric inferential, and right hemi-
spheric referential.
To date, no study has directly compared tasks involving
both pictures and words with tasks involving only words. The
tasks employed in this study are among thosemost frequently
used with neuropsychological patients, allowing to relate the
results of this study with the neuropsychological literature.2. Experimental methods
2.1. Subjects
A group of 23 subjects (mean age ¼ 22 years; mean
education ¼ 13 years) participated in the experiment. Allubstrates of inferential and referential semantic processing,
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corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Participants reported being
free of neurological disorders or history of seizures. All were
right handed, with a mean score on the Edinburgh Handed-
ness Inventory of þ95 (Oldfield, 1971). Participants were
informed about the procedures and informed consent was
obtained after a safety screening. The experimental methods
had ethical approval from the local Human Ethics Committee.2.2. Behavioral procedure
To test our experimental hypothesis, four experimental tasks
and one baseline condition (B) were included in the experi-
mental design. The experimental conditions could be cate-
gorized according to two dimensions, processing modality
(inferential or referential) and type of task (naming or
matching). Two referential tasks involved pictures (picture
naming, i.e., RefNam, and word-picture matching, i.e., refer-
ential matching e RefMat), while the two inferential tasks
involved only words (naming by definition, i.e., InfNam, and
wordeword matching, i.e., inferential matching e InfMat).
2.2.1. Stimuli
For the picture naming task 48 pictures were selected from the
Viggiano et al. (2004) battery. In the word-picture matching
task 48 more pictures from the same battery were used as
target pictures, while 96were used as distracters. Importantly,
therewas no overlap between the pictures used during picture
naming and word-picture matching task. For the naming by
definition task the target words were selected in the medium
range of frequency (De Mauro et al., 1993) and the definitions
were built according to a rating performed on 30 young
subjects that were asked to complete the InfNam task on an
extensive list of stimuli. For the construction of the worde-
word matching task the distracters were selected in order to
leave no ambiguity in the selection of the target word. Items
were coded for a number of variables known to influence
general difficulty (word frequency, word length and famil-
iarity) and the task blocks were balanced on these basis.
Independent sample T-tests showed no significant differences
(p > .05) in any of the coded variables between the experi-
mental blocks (eight for each task) and between the four
principal conditions (RefNam, InfNam, RefMat, InfMat).
Furthermore, an equal number of living and non-living items
(for both words and pictures) were included in each experi-
mental block and in each principal condition.
The word stimuli were presented in black lower-case
letters (Arial font size 42) on a white background, while the
pictures had a size of about 7  7 cm2 and a resolution of
300  300 dpi in all tasks involving images.
Each task began with the instruction [RefNam: “Denomina
le immagini!” (Name the pictures!); InfNam: “Denomina!”
(Name it!); RefMat: “Scegli l’immagine!” (Choose the picture!);
InfMat: “Scegli l’associazione!” (Choose the association!); B:
“Guarda!” (Look at it!)] presented for 1000msec and followed by
a 1000 msec delay. For each of the four experimental tasks,
blocks of six trials were presented for 4000msec each and with
an inter-trial interval of 2000 msec. During the B condition
a fixation crosswas presented for 34000msec andwas followedPlease cite this article in press as: Marconi D, et al., The neural s
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38 sec each (including instruction), for all the conditions.
Concerning the RefNam task, one picture was displayed in
the center of the screen, while in the InfNam task a sentence
was presented in the center of the screen; in both the naming
tasks the subjects had to look at the stimulus and to overtly
name the pictured object or the object corresponding to the
definition. In the RefMat task a word was shown at the top
center of the screen and the three possible pictures were pre-
sented underneath on the left, center and right; the subjects
were asked to select, by a button press, the picture corre-
sponding to the word being shown. Finally, in the InfMat task
the target word was presented at the top center of the screen
while the three words were displayed underneath on the left,
center and right; the subjects had to choose, by a button press,
the word most closely related to the target word. During the B
condition the subjects were simply asked to look at the fixation
cross displayed at the center of the screen.
During each experimental condition, subjects were
instructed to respond as fast as possible. During naming tasks,
participant responses were delivered through a plastic tube
from inside the scanner to a microphone connected to
a computer, outside the scanner room. During the matching
tasks, the subjects made a speeded response decision via
a three-choice button press, using three fingers, selecting one
of the three displayed words or pictures depending on their
position on the screen (left, center or right).2.3. fMRI procedure
Four runs were constructed for fMRI acquisition. Each run
included two RefNam blocks, two InfNam blocks, two RefMat
blocks, two InfMat blocks and two B blocks. Each run lasted
about 6min. The order of the experimental blocks within each
run was pseudo-randomized, such that there were never two
consecutive blocks of the same task, and the order of
presentation of the runs was fully randomized across
subjects.
At the foot of the magnet bore, a translucent screen was
placed to which stimuli were delivered via a projector con-
nected to a laptop outside themagnet room. Presentation 10.1
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA, USA) was used for the
presentation of stimuli and response collection. A mirror
system inside the magnet room allowed the participants to
view the translucent screen from inside the magnet. Partici-
pants were trained to minimize head, jaw and tongue move-
ment while naming in order to reduce the amount of
movement artefacts. In order to control for motor activations,
half the subjects used the right hand and half the left hand for
the two tasks involving a finger press. A computer recorded
both button responses and voice onset times (VOT) via
Presentation.
2.3.1. Behavioral data
A repeated measure of analysis of variance (ANOVA) on both
accuracy and reaction times (RTs) was conducted to investi-
gate differences between the four tasks. Post-hoc analyses
(Bonferroni correction) followed in order to explore the
significant differences.ubstrates of inferential and referential semantic processing,
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An fMRI technique was used (3T Intera Philips body scanner,
Philips Medical Systems, Best, NL, 8 channels-sense head coil,
SENSE reduction factor ¼ 2, TE ¼ 30 msec, TR ¼ 2000 msec,
FOV ¼ 240  240, matrix size ¼ 128  128, 30 contiguous axial
slices per volume, 210 volumes for each run, slice
thickness ¼ 4 mm). Whole-brain functional images were ob-
tained with a T2*-weighted gradient echo, echo-planar
sequence, using blood-oxygenation-level-dependent contrast.
Ten dummy scans preceded each run, all of which were then
discarded prior to data analysis to optimize Echo Planar
Imaging (EPI) image signal.
A high resolution structural MRI was obtained for all
subjects during scanning (MPRAGE, 150 slice T1-weighted
image, TR ¼ 8.03 msec, TE ¼ 4.1 msec; flip angle ¼ 8,
TA ¼ 4.8 min, resolution ¼ 1 mm  1 mm  1 mm) in the axial
plane. Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM5) (Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK), running
on Matlab 6.5 (The Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) was used for
preprocessing and statistical analysis.
2.3.3. Image pre-processing
Prior to analysis, all images for all the tasks underwent a series
of preprocessing steps. Prior to realignment, time series
diagnostics using tsdiffana (Matthew Brett, MRC CBU: http://
imaging.mri-cbu.cam.ac.uk/imaging/DataDiagnostics) were
conducted to ensure the quality of the functional data, as
scans or slices that show deviations from time-series mean
may be corrupt and need more detailed inspection. For each
scanning run, then, all volumes were realigned to the first
volume of the first run in order to neutralize effects of intra
and intersession movements. Volume artefacts due to move-
ment were detected in five subjects; bad volumes were
repaired using the ArtRepair Toolbox (http://cibsr.stanford.
edu/tools/ArtRepair/ArtRepair.htm). This toolbox estimates
volume artefacts and points out the volumes to be deweighted
during the design matrix estimation. Bad volumes were
determined based on scan-to-scan motion (1 SD change in
head position) and outliers relative to the global mean signal
(3 SD from the global mean). All repaired volumes were then
deweighted as specified in the SPM design matrix. Additional
volumes contiguous to large discontinuities in global intensity
or movement even after repair were also deweighted as they
could degrade the accuracy of the design matrix estimation.
Mean EPI image of each participant was computed and
spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) single subject template (Collins et al., 1994; Holmes
et al., 1998) using the “unified segmentation” function in
SPM5. This algorithm is based on a probabilistic framework
that enables image registration, tissue classification, and bias
correction to be combined within the same generative model.
The derived parameters of a discrete cosine transform, which
define the deformation field deformations for each subject,
were applied to the individual realigned EPI volumes, in order
to bring them into a standardized MNI space.
All images were thus transformed into standardMNI space
and re-sampled to 2 mm  2 mm  4 mm voxel size. Finally,
the T2*-weighted volumes were smoothed using a Gaussian
kernel with 8 mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM), in
order to account for any residual between-subject variationPlease cite this article in press as: Marconi D, et al., The neural s
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provide for corrected statistical inference and in order to
increase the signal to noise (Friston et al., 1994). Data were
highpass-filtered at 1/128 Hz and were then analyzed with
a general linear model (GLM) as implemented in SPM5.
Temporal autocorrelation was modeled using an autore-
gressive (AR) (1) process.
2.3.4. fMRI analysis
We adopted a two-stage random-effects approach to ensure
generalizability of the results at the population level (Penny
and Holmes, 2003). At the individual level, pre-processed
images were first analyzed with a GLM. For each participant,
wemodeled the four experimental tasks and the baseline task
(RefNam, InfNam, RefMat, InfMat and B).
Contrast maps from individual subjects were then entered
into a random-effects analysis to assess their significance at
the group-level (n ¼ 23 participants). The individual data
consisted of the contrast maps (RefNam-B, InfNam-B, RefMat-
B, InfMat-B) that accounted for the BOLD signal, which co-
varied with each of the four tasks as compared to baseline.
For the second-levelmulti-subjects analysis, all contrastmaps
were entered in a multiple regression without constant term
model analysis with five regressors: (1) (Main RefNam) a cate-
gorical regressor modeling the average BOLD amplitude
produced by the RefNam task; (2) (Main InfNam) a categorical
regressor modeling the average BOLD amplitude produced by
the InfNam task; (3) (Main RefMat) a categorical regressor
modeling the average BOLD amplitude produced by the
RefMat task; (4) (Main InfMat) a categorical regressormodeling
the average BOLD amplitude produced by the InfMat task; (5)
(RTs) a linear regressor, modeling the differential RTspro-
duced by each subject in response to the four different
experimental tasks (RefNam, InfNam, RefMat, InfMat). This
regressionmodel accounted for the mean effect of each of the
four tasks subtracted from B and allowed estimation of BOLD
signal change specific to inferential or referential processes
and not reflecting differences between RT patterns.
Hence, in this analysis, inferential semantic processing
(INF) was defined in contrast to referential semantic process-
ing (REF).
First, a “conjunction” procedure via inclusive masking was
adopted to identify significant regions of a common network
activated by inferential and referential tasks.
To identify regions involved in inferential processing
common to referential processing we assessed the conjunc-
tion of the two inferential tasks (2 & 4) inclusively masking
them with the conjunction of the two referential tasks (3 & 5)
(at p < .05 uncorrected).
To highlight referential processing activations common to
inferential processingwe entered the two referential tasks (3& 5)
in a conjunction analysis inclusively masked with the conjunc-
tion of the two inferential tasks (2 & 4) (at p < .05 uncorrected).
With this masking procedure, results are restricted to
regions inside the mask area (inclusive masking), enabling to
highlight the common regions of activation for which voxels
reached a higher t statistic than the value corresponding to
a voxel-level Familywise Error (FWE)-corrected p value of .05
for the conjunction of the two inferential tasks or the two
referential tasks.ubstrates of inferential and referential semantic processing,
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 2 ) 1e1 2 7The first contrast computed in the second-level analysis
included both inferential tasks (InfNam and InfMat), to reveal
the areas activated specifically during inferential processing
as compared to referential processing (RefNam and RefMat).
The second contrast instead included the two referential
tasks (RefNam and RefMat) to highlight areas specifically
active for referential processing with respect to inferential
processing. For instance, to compare INF with REF, we
computed the following contrast 1 1 1 1, which we refer to
as INF-minus-REF, to simplify. To compare instead REF with
INF we computed the contrast 1 1 1 1 which we refer to as
REF-minus-INF.
Brain activation maps were thresholded at p < .05 cor-
rected for multiple comparisons (FWE), and clusters with
a minimum of 10 voxels were reported.
Parameter estimates (or average relative changes in BOLD)
were generated in each task across INF and REF, to better
illustrate the data at the voxels of interest. For localmaxima of
Z-scores in the clusters evidenced in the two contrasts, the
MNI coordinates were reported.3. Results
3.1. Behavioral data
There was an accuracy rate of 93.1% (SD ¼ 7.2) in the RefNam
task, of 88.6% (SD ¼ 6.5) in the InfNam task, of 99.5% (SD ¼ .9)
in the RefMat task and of 97.7% (SD ¼ 2.8) in the InfMat task. A
repeated measures ANOVA underlined that there were
significant differences in correct responses between the four
tasks [F(1,3) ¼ 25.81, p < .0001]. Post-hoc analyses highlighted
that both matching tasks were easier than naming taskTable 1eConjunction of the two inferential tasks (p[ .05 FWE c
referential tasks (p[ .05 uncorrected). Multiple peaks within a
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InfMat vs RefNam: p < .008; InfMat vs InfNam: p < .00001); in
addition, the RefNam task was performed better that the
InfNam task (p < .01).
As far as RTs are concerned, mean Rts were 1328.6 msec
(SD ¼ 265.5) for the RefNam task, 2759.1 msec (SD ¼ 455.0) for
the InfNam task, 1106.4 msec (SD ¼ 236.9) for the RefMat task
and 1964.6 msec (SD ¼ 374.2) for the InfMat task. A repeated
measures ANOVA underlined that RTs differed between the
four tasks (F (1, 3) ¼ 319.9, p < .01). Post-hoc analyses (Bon-
ferroni correction) highlighted that the subjects were faster
during RefMat than during all the other tasks (RefMat vs
RefNam: p < .002; RefMat vs InfNam: p < .001; RefMat vs
InfMat: p < .0001). Furthermore, performance on RefNam was
significantly faster than on the InfNam and InfMat tasks
(RefNam vs InfNam: p < .001; RefNam vs InfMat: p < .0001),
while in the InfMat task RTs were faster than on the InfNam
task (p < .0001).
3.2. fMRI results
3.2.1. Common network
The conjunction e masking procedure for inferential tasks
revealed a bilateral network of brain areas, including the
precentral and postcentral gyri, the inferior frontal gyrus (pars
orbitalis) and the superior temporal gyrus. Additional activa-
tions in the left hemisphere included the middle and inferior
temporal gyri, the temporal pole, the inferior occipital gyrus
and cerebellum. Further activations in the right hemisphere
were found in the calcarine gyrus and the lingual gyrus and
the insula (see Table 1 for details).
The conjunction emasking procedure for referential tasks
highlighted a bilateral activation of the cerebellum, theorrected) inclusivemaskedwith the conjunction of the two
cluster are shown on subsequent lines. Voxels p values are
Voxel level Coordinates
corrected Z x y Z
.000 Inf 16 92 4
.000 7.52 20 92 8
.000 7.07 20 64 24
.000 6.55 52 8 40
.000 6.39 54 12 32
.000 6.28 40 8 36
.000 6.18 36 30 4
.000 5.89 62 20 4
.002 5.32 38 30 0
.005 5.15 52 0 20
.006 5.13 52 14 16
.010 5.00 6 26 4
.005 5.13 42 24 0
.010 5.00 36 22 12
.007 5.07 18 30 8
.008 5.06 46 4 32
.008 5.04 58 10 24
.011 4.98 50 22 0
ubstrates of inferential and referential semantic processing,
Table 2eConjunction of the two referential tasks (p[ .05
FWE corrected) inclusivemaskedwith the conjunction of
the two inferential tasks (p [ .05 uncorrected). Multiple
peaks within a cluster are shown on subsequent lines.





P corrected Z x y Z
Bilateral clusters
Left SMA 91 .001 5.53 0 2 60




13 .000 5.87 28 76 12
Cerebellum 11 .001 5.61 16 30 28
Fusiform gyrus 10 .001 5.49 38 46 8
Putamen 12 .004 5.23 22 18 8
Caudate nucleus .009 5.02 22 26 4
Thalamus 10 .006 5.11 6 20 12
Right hemisphere clusters
Cerebellum 3724 .000 7.78 34 68 24
Lingual gyrus .000 7.49 6 94 12
Fusiform gyrus .000 7.43 40 46 24




26 .003 5.28 36 30 8
Insula lobe .011 4.98 40 24 4
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 2 ) 1e1 28fusiform gyrus, the supplementary motor area (SMA) and the
thalamus. Additional activations included the left middle
occipital gyrus, the right lingual gyrus and the right inferior
frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis), putamen, caudate nucleus and
insula (see Table 2).
3.2.2. Inferential versus referential processing
Specific activations for inferential processing (compared with
referential one) involved mainly the left hemisphere and
included the middle and superior temporal gyri and the pre-
central gyrus. In addition, a significant cluster of activations
was found in the right superior temporal gyrus. TheTable 3 e Brain areas active in the contrast inferential
minus referential. All voxel significant at p< .05 FWE
corrected. Multiple peaks within a cluster are shown on
subsequent lines. Voxels p values are provided for FWE








86 .000 5.66 58 34 0
Superior
temporal gyrus
.015 4.90 62 38 12
Middle
temporal gyrus
16 .010 5.01 60 18 12




14 .006 5.10 56 24 8
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ted in Table 3. Parameter estimates at significantly activated
voxels showed that activity in the left middle temporal gyrus
was specifically increased for both inferential tasks (InfNam
and InfMat). Representative parameter estimates are shown
in Fig. 1.
3.2.3. Referential versus inferential
Referential versus inferential processing did not yield signifi-
cant activations at the threshold of p < .05 FWE corrected at
the whole brain level. Our a priori prediction was that refer-
ential tasks, constituted by an association between words and
pictures, would recruit the RFG, which has been reported to be
specific for nonverbal tasks in both control (Thierry and Price,
2006; Vandenberghe et al., 1996 as reanalyzed by Thierry and
Price, 2006; Vandenbulcke et al., 2006; Hocking and Price,
2009) and patient studies (Butler et al., 2009). Table 4 reports
the peak coordinates localized in the RFG highlighted in the
aforementioned studies. To get an unbiased estimate of acti-
vation from the RFG for the four tasks (two REF and two INF)
employed in this study, we created an 8 mm radius spherical
Region of Interest (ROI) that was centered on themedian of the
x, y and z coordinates (44, 46, 22) reported for the RFG in the
studies summarized in Table 4. The mean distance of coordi-
nates reported in the studies included in the table from the
center of our RFG spherical ROI (44,46, 22) (calculated as the
average of themean absolute values of the difference inmmsec
between each x, y and z value reported in the table and the x, y
and z coordinates of the RFG ROI) was 2444 mmsec with
a standard deviation of 2.32 mmsec (min ¼ 0 mmsec;
max ¼ 8 mmsec).
The RFG ROI was then used to extract mean activation
estimates (eigenvalues) from the four contrast images coding
the main effects of each task (Main RefNam, Main InfNam,
Main RefMat, Main InfMat) for each participant (N ¼ 23) using
SPM5 Easy-ROI toolbox (http://www.sbirc.ed.ac.uk/cyril/).
Those estimates were then entered into a 2-by-2 ANOVA with
the factors COGNITIVE PROCESS (referential or inferential)
and TYPE OF TASK (naming or matching) in SPSS (SPSS Inc.,
Chicago, IL). This analysis revealed a significant main effect of
both factors, i.e., COGNITIVE PROCESS [F (1,22) ¼ 52.35,
p< .001] and TYPE OF TASK [F (1,22)¼ 74.02, p< .001]. Pairwise
comparisons adjusted for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni
corrected) revealed that estimates of activation were signifi-
cantly higher for referential (mean ¼ 5.65; SE ¼ .42) than
inferential processing (mean ¼ 2.90; SE ¼ .35) and that acti-
vation in the RFG was significantly higher for matching
(mean ¼ 5.38; SE ¼ .37) than naming tasks (mean ¼ 3.18;
SE ¼ .37). The COGNITIVE PROCESS  TYPE OF TASK interac-
tion did not reach significance [F (1,22) ¼ 1.94, p < .18].
Inspection of activity in the RFG decomposed for COGNITIVE
PROCESS revealed that referential processes induced signifi-
cantly more activity in the RFG ROI irrespective of the task e
picture naming (REFnam) (Mean Difference ¼ þ2.39; p < .001)
or picture matching (REFmat) (Mean Difference ¼ þ3.11;
p < .001) (see Fig. 2).
3.2.4. RTs
RTs show a significant correlation only with the anterior
intraparietal sulcus (see Table 5).ubstrates of inferential and referential semantic processing,
Fig. 1 e Functional data for inferential (INF) minus referential (REF) (yellow) are overlaid over a 3D render of the brain using
the SPM canonical mesh. (in MNI space) distributed with SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/; Welcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London). Plots of parameter estimates for the four tasks (REFNam, INFNam, REFMat,
INFMat) at peak coordinates for activation in the left middle temporal gyrus.
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 2 ) 1e1 2 94. Discussion
In the first place, our findings indicate that inferential and
referential processes engage a common network of brain
areas. This network largely corresponds to the “common
semantic system” outlined by many functional imaging
investigations (for an extensive review see Binder et al., 2009).
In other words, multiple brain regions are activated by any
task that requires access to semantic knowledge. It is partic-
ularly noteworthy that areas associated with visual process-
ing are engaged even when the modality of input is purelyTable 4 e Peak coordinates localized in the RFG.
Reference article Coordinates for RFG
Controls x y z
Vandenberghe et al., 1996 a 40 40 20 P
Thierry and Price, 2006 46 46 22 N
44 48 26 A
46 44 20 V
Vandenbulcke et al., 2006 45 54 24 T
36 51 21 P
42 48 27 T
Patients Hocking and Price, 2009 42 46 22 N
Butler et al., 2009 44 42 22 P
44 46 22 M
a As reanalyzed by Thierry and Price (2006).
b Highly significant e no difference in RTs and accuracy between tasks.
Please cite this article in press as: Marconi D, et al., The neural s
Cortex (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2012.08.001verbal (as with both inferential tasks), suggesting that access
to visuoperceptual information can also be observed in the
absence of any pictorial input.
We also found areas selectively engaged by inferential
processes, and, at a lower threshold, by referential processing.
The recruitment of left hemispheric brain regions, involving
some classical language areas Middle Temporal Gyrus (MTG),
appears to be specifically required only by inferential pro-
cessing, while activations in right visual/semantic processing
areas Frontal Gyrus (FG) were associated with referential
processing. The imaging results thus provide some evidence
in favor of the hypothesis that the type of processingDifference Task
ictures > words Semantic decision task
onverbal > verbal (over modalities) Categorization,
sequence interpretation taskuditory modality
isual modality
ask-modality interaction Associative-semantic task,
visuoperceptual judgmenticture:associative vs visuoperceptual
ask-modality interactionb
onverbal > verbal Audiovisual matching task
icture > words Associative-semantic task
edian coordinates difference RFG
ubstrates of inferential and referential semantic processing,
Fig. 2 e Mean activation estimates (with standard error
bars) extracted in the RFGROI from the four contrast images
relative to the main effect of each referential and
inferential task.
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 2 ) 1e1 210requirements (within the lexicon, or from the lexicon to the
world) are associated with differences in brain activation,
independently of task (naming vs matching). The clinical
cases of selective impairment of inferential or referential
processing would then be explained as reflecting selective
damage or defective access to the “inferential” or the “refer-
ential” regions.
Selective impairment of inferential processing is mainly
characterized by preserved RefNam, associated with defective
performance in tasks such as naming from verbal definition,
synonym matching, etc. This clinical picture has not been
reported in classical neuropsychology and was actually
described for the first time as “naming without comprehen-
sion” by Heilman et al. (1981, 1976), who explained it as
a unidirectional disconnection from Wernicke’s area to the
concept center. Within a cognitive neuropsychological
framework, a similar phenomenon was attributed to
preserved functioning of a direct route from visual represen-
tations to the lexicon, bypassing the semantic system
(Kremin, 1986). The present findings are compatible with the
hypothesis that selective inferential impairment may require
a sparing of the referential regions and a selective involve-
ment of LH areas required by inferential processing in nor-
mally functioning brains. The regions that were engaged by
inferential processing are part of the “classical language
areas” in the left hemisphere perisylvian region. They thus
provide additional evidence for the role of specific compo-
nents of this region in aspects of linguistic processing that goTable 5 e Correlation between RTs and activations
(p[ .05 FWE corrected). Voxels p values are provided for








86 .000 5.66 32 38 32
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and picture naming. The temporal area of activation was
centered in the middle temporal gyrus, that may be consid-
ered to reflect the additional demands on lexical and sentence
processing posed by inferential, as contrasted with referen-
tial, tasks. The probability to observe effects of selective
damage to the middle temporal gyrus may indeed be low
because of the usual pathological mechanisms of vascular
aphasia, which is often due to middle cerebral artery strokes
involving large parts of the perisylvian territory. Small
infarctions limited to the middle temporal gyrus can be
observed only in the case of embolic strokes. It may thus be
relevant that most of the reported cases have diagnosis of AD,
a condition in which neocortical damage may be relatively
selective in the early stages of disease. One of the purest cases
of dissociation (Case ORL) had a small focal lesion involving
the inferior frontal gyrus, i.e., a region which is part of the
classical lexical retrieval network (Kremin, 1986).
How to explain the most commonly reported dissociation,
i.e., impaired RefNam with preserved inferential processing?
This dissociation is found in the clinical syndrome of optic
aphasia, a modality-specific naming disorder (Farah, 2004; Gil
et al., 1985; Lhermitte and Beauvois, 1973; Riddoch and
Humphreys, 1987b) characterized by impaired naming from
vision associated with preserved visual recognition (demon-
strated, for example, by gesturing the object’s use), as well as
with preserved naming from other modalities, such as touch
and audition. The syndromewas originally reported by Freund
(1889) and interpreted as the consequence of a damage to the
left hemispheric optic pathways, associated with defective
transmission of information from the right-sided visual areas
to the left hemispheric language area (it should be noted that
this is the same explanation as Dejerine (1892) will later
provide for the syndrome of pure alexia). Optic aphasia has
thus been classically considered as a disconnection syndrome
between vision and semantics. The pattern of performance is
problematic for the idea of a single semantic system, and has
been considered to support the hypothesis of multiple
semantic systems, either a visual and a verbal semantic
system (Beauvois, 1982; Lhermitte and Beauvois, 1973) or
a right hemisphere and a left hemisphere semantic system
(Coslett and Saffran, 1989, 1992), which are “disconnected” in
these patients. Other accounts have preserved the idea of
a single semantic system, proposing that semantic represen-
tations exhibit graded functional specialization rather than
being entirely amodal or modality-specific. Damage to
connections from vision to regions of semantics near
phonology is supposed to impair visual object naming farmore
than visual gesturing or tactile naming because of a topo-
graphic bias on learning favoring short connections, as well as
of the non-systematic nature of naming in comparison, for
example, to visual gesturing (Plaut, 2002). The idea is actually
close to proposals that account for optic aphasia as amild form
of associative agnosia (DeRenzi andSaetti, 1997) or as a formof
partial semantic disorder (Hillis andCaramazza, 1995; Riddoch
and Humphreys, 1987b). The present functional MR findings
appear thus to be compatible with the classical disconnection
account for the syndrome of optic aphasia, as well as with the
possible selective involvement of the right temporo-occipital
region. The right temporo-occipital region has beenubstrates of inferential and referential semantic processing,
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 2 ) 1e1 2 11suggested to be the neural substrate of the structural
description system, at the interface between visuoperceptual
processing and semantic analysis (Zannino et al., 2011). In the
patient described by Vandenbulcke et al. (2006) damage to this
area was associated with defective retrieval of the visual
attributes of both living and non-living entities. In the same
paper, the authors reported a functional imaging study,
showing that the same regionwas activated for the retrieval of
visual features, but only when the input was pictorial rather
than verbal. In these patients, inferential processing is
preserved because access is possible from the auditory
modality to the intact semantic processing areas.
In conclusion, the distinction between inferential and
referential semantic processing proposed by Marconi (1997)
appears to map on incompletely overlapping brain mecha-
nisms. While a common set of brain areas is engaged by any
task requiring access to semantic knowledge, additional left
hemispheric regions are required in the case of inferential
tasks, such as naming from definition and word matching. In
addition, the right temporo-occipital cortex is selectively
engaged by semantic access from pictorial information. These
imaging findings are thus compatible with the clinical obser-
vations of double dissociation between referential and infer-
ential abilities.r e f e r e n c e s
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